Curriculum Vitae Gerard Strijards (1954)

Geboren in Rotterdam Oud-West kwam Gerard in de zestiger jaren in het industriële Eindhoven terecht. Zijn vader was verzekeringsinspecteur bij een Hollandse maatschappij. Hij kon daar een uiterst voordelige inspectie krijgen in het deel van Zuid-Oost Brabant dat door grootschalige ruilverkaveling een volledig andere agrarische inrichting kreeg met tal van uiterst kostbare opstallen en machinerieën. Eindhoven werd gedomineerd door een lampenfabrikant met bijbehorende toeleveranciers. In dit van nijverheid stomende oord doorliep Gerard de humaniora via Gymnasium Alpha.

Hij studeerde rechten aan de Katholieke Hogeschool Tilburg en verkreeg zijn meesterstitel cum laude in 1978. Tevoren was hij beëedigd tot waarnemend-griffier bij de rechtbank te Den Bosch. Gerard werd wetenschappelijk medewerker bij de Hogeschool. Hij promoveerde cum laude in 1983 op het proefschrift “Facetten van Dwaling in het Strafrecht”. Daarvoor kreeg hij de Tjeenk Willink Prijs in 1983. Hij had best aan de universiteit verbonden willen blijven. Maar de linkse bestuurselite besloot dat daar geen plaats voor hem was. Daarom werd hij maar praktizijn bij een advocatenfirma aan de Heemraadsingel te Rotterdam.

In 1985 werd hij gerechtsauditeur bij de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. Hij werd tevens waarnemend griffier bij dat college en rechterplaatsvervanger bij de rechtbank Den Haag. In 1989 stapte hij over naar het departement van justitie. Daar ging hij zich met internationaal publiekrecht bezig houden en nationaal vreemdelingenrecht. In 1993 werd hij lid van de Nederlandse delegatie in de Ad Hoc Commissie tot oprichting van een permanent Internationaal Strafhof. De regering had tot speerpunt dat hof in Nederland te doen zetelen. In 2000 werd dat feitelijk verwezenlijkt. De ervaringen gaven Strijards inkijk in de onderhandelingen op supranationaal niveau. Hij kreeg tot opdracht de overbrenging van drie verdachten naar Nederland te regelen van een in Kamp Zeist te zetelen Schots tribunaal dat de bevoegdheid moest hebben naar Schots recht de strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheden vast te stellen samenhangende met de ontploffing aan boord van een Pan Am-vliegtuig vliegende boven het dorpje Lockerbie in 1988. Strijards moest de zetelovereenkomst regelen en de bijbehorende arrangementen ter uitvoering van de plichten van het gastland.

Voor Nederland was het een soort droge oefening voor zijn verplichtingen die het zou moeten nakomen als het gastland zou worden van het Internationaal Strafhof. In Den Haag zetelden al diverse tijdelijke tribunalen met een naar tijd, plaats en misdrijf gebonden competentie zoals het Joegoslavië-tribunaal. Strijards trad op als liaisonofficer en vele malen als “vriend van het hof” (“amicus curiae”) bij de terechtzittingen van die hoven en tribunalen. Het gaf hem internationaal een zekere roem en ruchtbaarheid. Die kunnen verklaren waarom Strijards nadien als raadadviseur werd toegevoegd aan het Parket-Generaal van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden met als specialisatie internationaal institutioneel publiekrecht en regelmatig optrad als “amicus curiae” voor strafhoven en gerechten die horen tot het Angelsaksisch rechtsmassief en Engels gewoonterecht – common law – toepassen, dat op verschillende punten deerlijk verschilt van het West-Europese Continentale recht. Dat recht past nogal wat vanzelfsprekendheden uit het Napoleontisch publieke recht toe. Het publieke recht van de Europese Unie doet dat óók. Het leidt tot centralisatie van de soevereine supranationale macht en een dichte abstracte generieke wetgeving die alleen voor eurocraten toegankelijk is.

Dat leidde inmiddels tot toenemend onbehagen bij de Angelsaksische lidstaten bij die vrijhandelsassociatie, die steeds meer als een staatsfederatie werd opgetuigd te Brussel. De BREXIT was daarvan een onbeoogd bijkomend effect, dat niet accidenteel zal blijken. Meermalen trad Strijards als zo’n “amicus” op te behoeve van Engelse Crown Courts. Ter illustratie van die activiteit volgt hieronder een  gecertificeerd afschrift van een procesverbaal van zulk een Crown Court-zitting te  Birmingham dat als gedingstuk doorslaggevend bleek bij de veroordeling van zware criminelen, die lid waren van een criminele organisatie waarvan de werkmaatschappij in Amsterdam operatief was, aangestuurd te Birmingham.

 Als lid van de internationale strafkamer bij de rechtbank Den Haag kon Strijards deze expertise uitbouwen. Hij gewaagde daarvan in diverse monografieën en werkte mee aan verschillende gezaghebbende volkerenrechtelijke standaardwerken die door of namens de Verenigde Naties werden uitgegeven. Daarvoor kreeg hij diverse onderscheidingen.

Strijards is gefascineerd door de verschillen in rechtsbeleving tussen de steeds vaker en steeds heftiger botsende rechtsmassieven die onderling steeds meer afhankelijkheidsrelaties vertonen waarbij kortsluitingen ontstaan. Maar voor een beperkte verzameling van staten zijn scheiding van de staatsmachten, rechterlijke onafhankelijkheid, het schuldprincipe en het legaliteitsprincipe, democratische legitimatie van staatshandelingen en respect voor grondrechten van het individu axiomatische uitgangspunten. De mondialisering van het rechtsverkeer doet door deze kortsluitingen steeds vaker het besef doorbranden dat de wereld nog steeds een geïnstitutionaliseerde ethische en morele anarchie is. De vraag is of de Westelijke wereld daarvoor bereid is zich te accommoderen. En zo niet, want daar dan de consequenties van zijn.

Official Affidavit as to the Criminal Procedural Law of the Kingdom of the Netherlands with regard to the purview and scope of the artt. 1261a, in conjunction with 126m, 126ma 126n- 126u and 539a, third indent of the Dutch Code on Procedural Law in Criminal Matters concerning – amongst others — interceptions with a view to assist a foreign jurisdiction of a member state of the European Union in exercising its penal enforcement powers according to the artt. 17-22 of the EU Convention concerning cooperation and assistance between EU-Member States  the 29th  of May 2000, based on an Act of the Council of the European Union Public. the 12th of July 2000 C197 2000 .

By Prof. Dr.G.A.M.Strijards LLM, Senior Legal Advisor at the Bureau for Legal Studies of the Prosecutorial Service of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Professor in International Criminal Law by special appointment at Groninguen University, Alternate Judge in the Chamber for International Criminal Matters in the The Hague District Court.

Case: Regina versus Anthony Cyril Spencer (also known Anthony Cyril Shipley Spencer and Patric John Taylor) and others

The Hague, the 16th of November 2009

As to the expertise

  1. With a view to the expertise of Prof.Dr. Strijards LLM, the following might be of some relevance. Strijards was appointed junior fellow researcher at Tilburg University in 1977 and assistant clark in the District Court of s-Hertogenbosch (criminal matters).
  2. He got his Ph.D. in Dutch Criminal Law in 1983 (cum laude) at Tilburg University. For this thesis, he was awarded the scientific Tjeenk Willink price in the same year.
  3. He wrote after that several books on international criminal matters. Amongst others, he wrote a book on international jurisdictional matters in interstatal criminal law (1983), a book on extradition (1988), the seating of international Ad Hoc Tribunals in The Hague (2000), the International Criminal Court (2003), interstatal cooperation and assistance within the European Union, the Accession of Turkey to the Union (III Vols.) (2004-2005). He contributed several commentaries on the 1998 Rome Statute in Triffterer’s Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to the artt. 3, 103-107 (1999, second edition 2008). For this, he has been awarded the golden medal for international law of the UN.
  4. He wrote several books on criminal law as well, f.e. on grounds for criminal accountability ( 1987), exculpatory and mitigating circumstances (1986) and incohate crimes and preparatory acts (1994).
  5. For his books and other publications in the field of criminal law he got the Pieter de la Court-price awarded by the Dutch Royal Society for Sciences in 1988. He wrote about 125 scientific publications on criminal matters.
  6. He was appointed a junior judge at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in 1986, especially with a view to international criminal law, until 1990. At the same time he has been appointed for lifetime alternate judge in the The Hague District Court. In 1990 he became junior advisor in international matters at the Justice Department of the Netherlands. In 1992 he got the rank of senior legal advisor in international legislative matters at the ministry of General Affairs. In this capacity, he drafted several concepts of legislation with a view to enable the Kingdom to fulfill its treaty obligations, for example with a view to the Schengen-Implementation Agreement, the Maastricht Treaty, The Amsterdam Treaty and the implementation legislation regarding the Yugoslavia-Tribunal, the R’wanda-Tribunal and several framework decisions of the Union on cooperation, assistance and enforcement. He was one of the co-drafters of the Special Powers of Investigation Act in question. In 1993 he was appointed delegate for justice affairs to the UN Prep-Com for the establishment of an International Criminal Court. In 2000 he has been appointed a senior legal advisor in international criminal matters at the Higher Prosecutorial Office of the Netherlands in the Hague. In 2007 he got the same appointment at the Scientific Bureau of the Prosecutorial Service of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
  7. In 1997 he has been inaugurated as a professor in international criminal law at Groninguen University.
  8. He is a member of the Scientific Board of the International Criminal Law Network in The Hague, supervisor of the Scientific Board of the Institute for Security, Freedom and Justice (EULEC) affiliated with the EU, and member of various international advisory committees. He is a visiting professor at various universities in other countries.
  9. Strijards has been summoned or cited in several cases to give testimony as an expert in criminal cases on issues of international law. For example, regarding the extraterritorial scope of international vehicular regulations of the Union, the locus delicti-doctrine and the principle of polypatridity. When cited to give evidence mere on issues of national Dutch law, Strijards complied with the citation, but, relying on the maxime ius curia novit (see below) he requested the judge to be freed from testifying. The request has always been complied with. He appeared on behalf of the Host Country several times in open court of the Yugoslavia Tribunal to give testimony on issues as the Dutch Statutory Regulations on the admittance, residence and settlement of foreigners in cases the Tribunal would like to grant conditional release pending procedures to accused, culprits, witnesses and the like. The Tribunal would like to know as to whether, in such cases, the released persons would get a licence to stay or not. Strijards had to show up several times before the Tribunal in cases of safe-housing and jurisdictional conflicts between the Tribunal and the Host Country. In those cases he answered on questions of law concerning Dutch Statutes, being “foreign law”for the Tribunal. Acting on behalf of the Host Country, he provided the Tribunal several times with translations of Dutch Statutory Provisions, renditions accepted by the Tribunal and the Host Country. See below ad art. 129ma.

As to the facts

The affidavit is based on the facts as stated in the outline of the case prepared in accordance with the direction of HHJ Judges Davies QC as contained in document “In the Birmingham Crown Court No. T2009 Regina versus Spencer”. It is not with this expert to ascertain as to whether those facts are correct. He has to confine himself to determine as to whether the finding as contained in the first indent of this outline, third sentence, that “the Dutch Police lawfully intercepted and recorded mobile phone calls between Anthony Spencer and other conspirators” is a correct one. It is the experts’ understanding that the adverb “lawfully” in this sentence  means “lawfully according Dutch law”.

As to the relevant Dutch Law on interception

  1. The abovementioned European Convention on cooperation and assistance in criminal matters (hereinafter: the Convention) entered into force for the Netherlands on the 23th of August 2005. The Convention provides for the possibility of intercept telecommunications on behalf of another EU-member state. The results of those interceptions may provided directly to the competent authorities of the administered state, even if that state did not make a formal, official request ex ante to that end. A request could be filed even ex post, id est: after the handing over of the auditive results by the competent authorities of the Dutch Prosecutorial Service. This is based on the art. 17-22 of the Convention. Via the direct channel – which is the normal, main, interstatal procedure – the results of the interceptions are at the immediate disposal of the competent authorities of the administered  EU-member state. There is no need of any judicial permission or ruling with a view to this direct assistance by the Dutch Prosecutorial Service. Especially there is no need of any formal decision of a pretrial magistrate or investigative judge giving explicite permission or approval to this modality of direct assistance. According to Dutch law, that is new in the system of interstatal assistance maintained by the Netherlands.
  2. The Dutch enabling legislation on this issue has been worked out more into detail in a directive of the Higher Prosecutorial Board of the Netherlands (Decision as of the 29th of August 2005) as interpreted in a memorandum as of the 7th of November 2005 directed to the competent district attorneys. In the request for interception – which could be filed afterwards – there should be given some data to the Dutch competent authorities according to art. 18, para 3. of the Convention. In the Dutch enabling legislation this has been elaborated in the artt. 126m, para. 6 and 126t, para 5 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedures. Those articles follow the texts of the Convention literally.
  3. In the directive several situations have been mentioned in which the direct interception on behalf of another state is lawful according to Dutch law. Two situations seem to be of relevance in the present case.
  • The person to be intercepted is present in the requesting state. The requesting state needs technical assistance of the administering state (art. 18, para. 2 sub a. of the Convention). This situation only occurs if the person in case uses mobile satellite systems. In that case the inception may only take place in the ground station. In the Netherlands this ground station is located in Burum. It belongs to Immarsat, part. Of the network of the KPN (Royal Post of the Netherlands). In such a case, the Netherlands will provide for the interception without any material scrutinization of the request in casu, according to art. 18, para. 5 of the Convention. As set out hereinafter, the administering authorities will be – according to Dutch law — presumed to have acted in conformity with those prescriptions, based on the enabling legislation. There is no need that the executing officers ascertain that the acted in conformity with the directive. If I am not mistaken this was partly the situation in this case, whereas Spencer cum alia were partly of the time present and active on English soil. The Dutch administering authorities acted in accordance to this directive. Therefore, their interceptions were lawful.
  • The person to be intercepted is present in the requested state. The interception can be done in the administering state. This is the situation as covered by article 18, para. 8 of the Convention. This is the “classical situation” as far as the Netherlands is concerned. In this case, the request should contain a summary of the facts, underlying the request for assistance. The Netherlands will (and shall) comply with the request provided only that the precondition of the rule of dual criminality has been met and that the Dutch Prosecutorial Service would have had the competence to intercept in an equivalent case committed on Dutch soil. In that case, the requesting state is competent to rescrutinise the request and its compliance according to its own national law; it might put forward additional conditions or requirements to the Netherlands as administering party. As far as I can see, no additional conditions have been putted forward by the authorities of the requesting state. If I am not mistaken this was partly the situation in the present case too, whereas Spencer cum alia acted partly on Dutch soil as well, as appears from the outline. In this respect, the Dutch authorities acted in accordance with the directive as well, which justifies the conclusion they acted lawfully according to Dutch law.
  1. The directive as mentioned above is decisive in Dutch all day practice in criminal matters. It is, in its turn, based on operative articles as contained in the Dutch Code on Procedures in Criminal Matters. Relevant in this case, as far as Dutch Criminal Procedural Law is concerned, are mainly three articles from the Dutch Code Book on Procedural Law: artt. 126m, 126ma, 539a, third indent of that Book.
  2. 539a, third indent, formulates, in general, the basic principles to be observed by the Dutch Prosecutorial Service when exercising penal enforcement powers outside of the Netherlands. Phone tapping has to be considered, by virtue of legal definition and long standing jurisprudence handed down by the Dutch Supreme Court, as an example of penal enforcement power.
  3. Those principles are: (a) in general, the lawful use of Dutch Penal Enforcement powers is restricted to the territorial area of the Kingdom. (b) Outside that area, that use is only permitted if based on explicit operative regulations stemming from a “permissive rule” agreed upon by the Netherlands and the territorial State. (c) A permissive rule in this sense may be laid down in (c1) a treaty, (c2) an Ad Hoc Agreement, (c3) letters of consent, been given afterwards by the territorial state, this with retroactivity.
  4. With regard to phonetapping resulting in the gathering of evidence outside the Kingdom’s territorial realm, art. 18 of the abovementioned Convention, established by the Council in accordance with article 34 of the Treaty on the European Union, on Mutual Assistance in criminal matters between the Member States of the European Union as of the 29th day of May 2000 functions as an “permissive rule” in this respect. It has been implemented by enabling  legislation in the Netherlands by virtue of a Statute as of the 26th of April 2002.
  5. According to this Statute, if phonetapping results in eavesdropping outside of the Netherlands the special consent of the competent territorial authority is needed, at forehand if possible, but in cases of necessity, afterwards, with retroactivity. There is no need to have an explicit consent for this. That is the substantive gist of art. 126ma of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The abovementioned directive simply repeats this.
  6. It the tapping happens, as a compulsory measure under the the command of the Dutch police duly supervised by the Dutch Prosecutorial Service in the Netherlands, completely within the territorial realm of the Netherlands, there is no need to rely on an interstatal permissive rule, even not in cases in which the dropping results in auditive effects outside the boundaries of the Kingdom.

In that case, art. 126m completely suffices. The consent for tapping should be given by decision of the Districts Attorney if the reasonable suspicion regards a serious crime, jeopardizing the Dutch society in a real way.

As to art. 126ma in particular

  1. Attached to this statement is the most recent version of article 126ma as abovementioned. The copy dates from the 8th of Februari 2008. The source is the Official Statal Legislative Monitor (Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden) dd 01-06-2006, Nr. 300. The article went into force as of the first of september 2006, by virtue of Royal Decree dd 01-07-2006, Official Statal Legislative Monitor (Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden) dd 04-07-2006. The official comments can be found in Kamerstukken 26671 (Hansard of the Upper and Lower House Nr 26671).
  2. The version is only available in Dutch.
  3. If asked to translate the article, Strijards would translate it as follows: ” artikel 126ma —1. If in case of issuance of an order as meant in article 126m, third indent, it is known that the user of the number, meant in article 126m, second indent, para. C), is present on the territory of another State, that State will be notified of the intention to tap the telecommunication, if a treaty so prescribes and with full application of that treaty; the consent of that state has to be required before the enforcement of the order.”
  4. If asked to comment on this first indent, Strijards would comment it as follows: (a) the consent of the other State is only required if a Treaty so prescribes. If no Treaty is available, the consent is not needed, whereas the tapping itself is not be considered as an enforcement measure albeit that the measure is, undoubtedly, an act of criminal proceedings. The consent of the other State will be presumed as a matter of course, unless there are reasonable ground (a) that no consent has been asked; (b) that no consent has been given; (c) that the consent did not cover the tapping in concreto; (d) that the consent has been given by misinformation. This is the application of the maxime omnia rite atque sollemniter acta esse praesumuntur (see below). The consent may be categorical. If no consent has been given, the consent can be asked afterwards, but than the territorial State has to declare explicitly that it renounce its territorial sovereignty in this respect and that it discharges the Netherlands of the international legal consequences of the infringement on that sovereignty.
  5. The translation of the second indent runs as follows: “—2. If after the commencement of the telecommunication tapping by virtue of the order it comes to the knowledge (of the tapping authority) that the user is present on the territory of another State, that State will be notified of the tapping, if a treaty so prescribes and with full application of that treaty; the consent of that State has to be obtained (by that authority).”
  6. The comments of Strijards on this indent, if they would be required, would run mutatis mutandis as the comments regarding the first indent.
  7. The translation of the third indent of this article runs as follows: “—3. The District Attorney may also issue an order, as meant in article 126m, third indent, in case that order is necessary to request another State to tap telecommunication with a technical device and to record it or to tap it in order to relegate the results directly to the Netherlands in order to be recorded there via a technical device.”

As to the expertise of a District Attorney

  1. In the Netherlands, the judiciary departs, according to long standing jurisprudence, from the legal assumption ius curia novit. The Dutch judiciary acknowledges, by virtue of its office, Dutch Law, legislation and jurisprudence. This is an irrebuttable presumption of law (praesumptio iuris et de iure). There is no expert who has the authority to give the Dutch judiciary guidance in Dutch legal matters, others than members of that judiciary. The attorneys of the Prosecutorial Service being member of that judiciary have the same authority. Only the Dutch supreme Court can correct them. With regard to other states, the members of the judiciary enjoy the same authority erga omnes by virtue of their appointment and their office according to Dutch law. A district attorney of the Dordrecht Prosecutorial Service belongs to the Dutch Prosecutorial Service.
  2. Secondly, according to Dutch Law, as far as investigative actions and prosecutorial actions are concerned, the maxim goes omnia rite atque solemniter esse acta praesumuntur or omnia praesumuntur rite atque solemniter esse acta (donec probetur in contrarium): all the acts of the prosecutorial authorities are deemed to be in line of the law unless the opposite proves to be within the likelihood. This also valid for transterritorial investigative actions.
  3. Professors in (Dutch) criminal law can only act as experts in open court when it deals with foreign criminal law, which law has to be considered as “facts” by virtue of a mandatory provision inserted in the Statute of the Organisation of the Judiciary. To give authoritative (mandatory) renditions on operative articles taken out from Dutch Statutes, they are deemed incompetent in Open Court.